This report provides a “data-driven analysis of vulnerabilities in our industrial and critical infrastructure.”

A trade war with China. A fragile agreement with North Korea. A growing fear of Russian hackers. Ahead of the 2018 U.S. midterm congressional elections, geopolitical conflict continues to play out in cyberspace.

This special report provides a deep dive into the cybersecurity practices of small and midmarket businesses.

This report reviews the research that has been conducted by the federal government concluding that secure online voting is not yet feasible. We examine the insoluble security problems that are inherent to casting ballots online, including server penetration attacks, client-device malware, attacks to emailed and faxed ballots in transit, denial-of-service attacks, disruption attacks and the challenge to reliably authenticate voters.

This report contains an overview of the threat trends and malware families Cylance’s customers faced in 2017. This information is shared with the goal of assisting security practitioners, researchers, and individuals in our collective battle against emerging and evolving cyberthreats.

This report offers a fine summary of the Internet of Health Things, and covers the many issues related to this growing industry.

This report examines the substantial economic costs that malicious cyber activity imposes on the U.S. economy. Cyber threats are ever-evolving and may come from sophisticated adversaries. Due to common vulnerabilities, instances of security breaches occur across firms and in patterns that are difficult to anticipate. Importantly, cyberattacks and cyber theft impose externalities that may lead to rational underinvestment in cybersecurity by the private sectorrelative to the socially optimal level of investment. Firms in critical infrastructure sectors may generate especially large negative spillover effects to the wider economy. Insufficient data may impair cybersecurity efforts. Successful protection against cyber threats requires cooperation across firms and between private and public sectors.

The Third-Party Security Risk Management Playbook (Playbook) is the definitive study of third-party security risk management practices. Based on in-depth interviews of risk executives from 30 domestic and global firms, it reveals the real-world capabilities and practices employed to manage third-party cyber risk, distilled into 14 capabilities with 72 common, emerging, and pioneering practices.

This blog post offers insight into the New ICS Attack Framework “Triton”

This report offers insight into the Win32/Industroyer a new threat for industrial control systems.

The latest Petya-like outbreak has gathered a lot of attention from the media. However, it should be noted that this was not an isolated incident: this is the latest in a series of similar attacks in Ukraine. This blogpost reveals many details about the Diskcoder.C (aka ExPetr, PetrWrap, Petya, or NotPetya) outbreak and related information about previously unpublished attacks.

In mid-November 2017, the Dragos, Inc. team discovered ICS-tailored malware deployed against at least one victim in the Middle East. The team identifies this malware as TRISIS because it targets Schneider Electric’s Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) enabling the replacement of logic in final control elements. TRISIS is highly targeted and likely does not pose an immediate threat to other Schneider Electric customers, let alone other SIS products. Importantly, the malware leverages no inherent vulnerability in Schneider Electric products. However, this capability, methodology, and tradecraft in this very specific event may now be replicated by other adversaries and thus represents an addition to industrial asset owner and operators’ threat models.

Dragos, Inc. was notified by the Slovak anti-virus firm ESET of an ICS tailored malware on June 8th, 2017. The Dragos team was able to use this notification to find samples of the malware, identify new functionality and impact scenarios, and confirm that this was the malware employed in the December 17th, 2016 cyber-attack on the Kiev, Ukraine transmission substation which resulted in electric grid operations impact. This report serves as an industry report to inform the electric sector and security community of the potential implications of this malware and the appropriate details to have a nuanced discussion.

“In an effort to expose a common problem we see happening in the industry, Cylance® would like to shed some light on just how easy it is to fake attribution. The key factor we should focus on, as an industry, is determining HOW an attacker can take down an organization, rather than focusing only on the WHO. Once we can identify how the attack happened, we can focus on what’s really important – prevention.”

This report offers a threat actor profile and indicators of compromise around the OceanLotusGroup actor.

Malware utilizing known Lazarus group tools was used in a heist of a Taiwan bank. This Malware was later uploaded to several repositories. This post analyses and summarizes the uploaded Malware from the repositories.

The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by an intensive build up of cyberattacks attempting to disrupt, deface and bring down critical Georgian governmental and civilian online infrastructure. The campaign has been reported in the media, with wide coverage suggesting the campaign was a spontaneous outburst of popular feeling in Russia lead by independent hackers. However, as this report suggests, the offensive was too large, coordinated, and sophisticated to be the work of independent hackers; the evidence leads by-and large to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in St. Petersburg, Russia. Whilst only a criminal investigation can directly prove the involvement of the Kremlin, both experts and commentators have accused Moscow of sponsoring the attacks as their magnitude requires the involvement of the kind of resources only a state-sponsor can provide.

This paper cites a Dimensional Research survey of 250 IT security professionals in financial services organizations located in the U.S., U.K., Germany, France and Australia. The survey examines the challenges faced by the financial services industry in managing certificates, and the results illustrate the importance of incorporating CA-agility into a certificate management strategy. The survey also explores the federal government and other industries, including healthcare, retail and technology.

“Many businesses and government agencies have embraced supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems or industrial control systems (ICS) in recent years, but the technologies face major security challenges. Nearly 6 in 10 organizations using SCADA or ICS that were surveyed by Forrester Consulting in a study commissioned by Fortinet indicate they experienced a breach in those systems in the past year—and many of those organizations are adding to their risk by allowing technology and other partners a high level of access into their systems. Most organizations also report connections between their traditional IT systems and their SCADA/ICS, introducing the potential for outside hackers to penetrate these control systems.”

The Canadian Survey of Cyber Security and Cybercrime was conducted for the first time to measure the impact of cybercrime on Canadian businesses. This release coincides with Cyber Security Awareness Month, which is an internationally recognized campaign held each October to inform the public of the importance of cyber security.The Canadian Survey of Cyber Security and Cybercrime was conducted for the first time to measure the impact of cybercrime on Canadian businesses. This release coincides with Cyber Security Awareness Month, which is an internationally recognized campaign held each October to inform the public of the importance of cyber security.

This report seeks to answer the question, “What will shape the next 12 months in cybersecurity?”